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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

MARION 0. WRIGHT,
Plaintiff and Res(J)on.dent,

-vs.-

Case No.
7566

THERON W. MAYNARD,
DefendanJt and AppelZant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant at page 2 of his brief sets forth his
"alleged" Statement of Fact. However, it is. obvious
that defendant has employed the wrong nomenclature
and intends his misleading statements to be argument.
The facts of the case are as follows :
Plaintiff, Marion 0. Wright, resided near the northerly outskirts but within the corporate limits of the City
of Orem. (Tr. 106). His home was on the east side of
Highway 91, north of a slight bend in Highway 91. Highway 91 was at that time a two-lane highway. (Tr. 7,
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45, 80, 107). Immediately north 'Of plaintiff's home was
a garage owned and operated by plaintiff and referred
to in the record as Wright's Garage. (Tr. 4, 106). Two
separate driveways lead from Highway 91 easterly. One
of the driveways leads to Mr. Wright's home, the other
driveway leads into the garage. (Tr. 107-108). The exact
distance between driveways does not appear in the
record. The distance between Wright's Garage and the
curve to the south was variously estimated by the witnesses at from 250 to 400 feet. (Tr. 47, 57, 83, 92, 148,
238).
At the time of the crash here involved, which was
on January 14, 1949, plaintiff had in his employ, as an
assistant, one Walter J. Mitchell. (Tr. 4, 109). The regular hours of operation of Wright's Garage were from
9:00A.M. to 6:00P.M. (Tr. 4, 109). At the conclusion of
the working day and shortly after 6 :00 P.M. on January
14, 1949, the garage had been locked. (Tr. 5, 109). Mr.
Wright then remembered that he had to obtain some
parts for a truck he was working on. His car was locked
in the garage and Mr. Mitchell offered to drive him to
the parts store. (Tr. 110, 35). Mr. Mitchell in referring
to the conversation between him and Mr. Wright at that
time testified on cross-examination as follows: ('Tr. 35)

''A. He asked me if I -or he says, 'I have
got to go up to the parts house,' and he had his car
in the garage, and I said, 'I will run you up.'
Q. And you were going to bring him back7
A. Yes.''
(See also Tr. 110).
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:Jlr. :\Iitchell owns his own automobile which was a
1938 Ford and which was a light gray or tan in color.
(Tr. 6, -±-!, 101,111, 1-!9, 205). The car was parked in the
drive"-ay leading to the 'Yright home. ~lr. :Mitchell testified that he backed his automobile out of the driveway
onto Highway 91 and then pulled forward slightly so
that he was facing to the southeast. (T'r. 10). Just how
far the automobile was backed onto Highway 91 is a
matter concerning which there is a sharp dispute in the
evidence. This will be discussed later. When Mitchell
got the car on the road the automobile flooded out or
stalled. (Tr. 29, 37). At about the same time the lights
on the :Mitchell automobile went out. (Tr. 37). Mr.
Mitchell was not aware that the lights were out because
a flood light of 300 candle power located on the corner
of the garage flooded directly down on the driveway.
(Tr. 37, 112, 113, 114). The plaintiff came from his house
out to the road where the Mitchell car was stalled and
told Mitchell to get the car off the road. ( Tr. 11, 126,
136). Mr. :Mitchell testified that he realized the car was
in a dangerous situation where it was stalled. (Tr. 39,
40).

The defendant Theron W. Maynard was driving his
Dodge automobile in a northerly direction along Highway
91 through the City of Orem and toward Salt Lake City.
He had with him as passengers, his wife, Mr. and Mrs.
Raymond Klauck, and Mr. and Mrs. M. W. Wiscomb.
(Tr. 146, 147, 165, 232, 258, 274, 283, 293). Mr. Theron
W. Maynard was driving; Mrs. Maynard, his wife, was
in the center in the front seat, and Mr. M. W. Wiscomb
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was on the right side in the front seat. In the back seat ·
Mr. Raymond Klauck was in the center, Mrs. M. W.
Wiscomb was on the right and Mrs. Raymond Klauck
was on the left of the rear seat. (Tr. 232).
Defendant's wife, Mrs. T. W. Maynard, testified as
follows: (Tr. 276)
''A. As we were going on the outskirts of
Orem, we were going along, and all at once a light
colored car loomed right up square in front of us
on our side of the highway.''
The defendant, Mr. Theron W. Maynard, testified
that it was approximately 260 feet from the Wright
Garage south to the curve in Highway 91. (Tr. 148).
Mr. Maynard further testified: (Tr.173-174).

'' Q. Now tell us when you first-that automobile came within your vision, with reference
to the curve of that road, when you first saw that
automobile, where your car was.
A. I would estimate the distance at a hundred feet.
Q. You saw the automobile at a hundred
feet1
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Is that a hundred
feet from the curve or a hundred feet from the
automobile 1
A. A hundred feet from where I actually
-where my lights actually revealed the automobile, at the time my lights revealed it to me, and
I was conscious of it actually being there, I would
say I was a hundred feet from it.
MR. McCULLOUGH: In other words, you
were ·a hundred feet south of the automobile, the
Ford automo'bile, we will call it the Mitchell auto-
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mobile, Ford :Jl itehell automobile, you were a
hundred feet south, traveling on the right hand
side of the road 1
A. Yes, sir.''
:Mr. Raymond Klauck testified: (Tr. 303, 304).

'· Q. So that your car when your car got
around the turn, your lights picked this automobile up that was stalled on your side of the road,
about 300 feet to the north, is that correct'
A. \V ell, approximately.
Q. And that's your best judgment1
A. Uh huh.''

il

[!il

an

*

*

*

*

'' Q. So that your car then moved approximately 300 feet after you saw the lights light
up this car, until the accident occurred' 'That is
correct, isn't it1
A. I would say maybe it would be about
that.''
Mrs. M. W. Wiscomb testified: ( Tr. 286).

'' Q. And as you went around the bend your
lights-the lights of the car you were riding in, by
the lights you saw this Ford stalled in the road 1
A. Yes.
Q. The car was stopped 1
A. Yes.
Q. And there was a person on the south side
of it, or the right hand side of it, or the south side
of it as far as you are concerned, waiving his
arms?
A. Yes.''
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Mr. M. W. Wiscomb testified: (Tr. 238).

"Q. Then you stated, Mr. Wiscomb, that
there was a curve or a bend in the road?
A. Uh huh.
Q. Some distance south of the Wright
Garage, is that correct?
A. That's right.
Q. I think you stated that it was about where
the old road goes down to Geneva?
A. The old Geneva resort, not the Geneva
plant.
Q. The Geneva resort?
A. Yes, uh huh.
Q. That would be about how far south, in
feet, about how far south of the Wright Garage T
A. Oh, possibly 300.
Q. 300 feet. That's your best judgment?
A. Uh huh.
Q. And it is quite a-really isn't a curve, it
is more of a bend? A. That's right, it is more of a bend in the
road.
Q. And you recall coming around that bend'
A. Uh huh.
Q. And when you got to that bend, as you
came around, your lights showed up the Wright
Garage, did they not?
A. Showed up the automobile in the middle
of the road. ''
Mr. M. W. Wiscomh further testified: (Tr. 239, 240).
'' Q. You were sitting on the right hand side
of the front seat, were you not?
A. That's right.
Q. When you went around the turn, about
three hundred feet south of the Ford automobile,
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your lights showed the Ford automobile out there
in the road!
A. ~raybe not just as we made the turn,
but they did show it as we came upon it.
Q. How far would you say you were when
you first saw the Ford, as you went around this
bend, how far south were you from the Ford?
A. Oh, possibly 200, 250 feet, maybeQ. Between 200 and 250 feet'
A. Possibly that far.
Q. And did you see the party who was later
referred to as ~Ir. 'yright out on the right hand
side of the car, waiving his hands'
A. That's right. There was no lights on
the car, as apparently he was trying to show us.''

1:.:

It'

At the time the Mitchell automobile was first observed plaintiff was wearing white coveralls. ( Tr. 91,
142, 261, 287, 295). He was standing at the right, or south
side, of the Mitchell automobile facing southerly, in the
direction from which defendant's automobile was approaching, and waiving his arms. (Tr. 151, 176, 234,260,
276, 284, 287, 291, 295). Defendant .applied his brakes but
could not stop. Defendant Maynard testified as follows:
(Tr. 153).
"A. As I said, I played my brakes when it
was obvious that if I held them intact I would
slide directly broadside into the stalled automobile. So I merely played them to pull myself to the
right and avoid the accident.''
Mr. Maynard further testified: (Tr. 152)
''A. I had to make a mental decision on what
to do. There was traffic coming from the north.
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I couldn't go to the left without crashing head-on.
I had five passengers in my car to consider besides the man standing at the side of the car. I
applied the brakes and my car slid directly at the
stalled car. And I felt that if I continued in that
course I would pin that man between the two cars,
between the front end of my car and the side of the
stalled automobile. So I pulled my car to the
right, and played my brakes, to give me some traCtion to get to the right of that stalled automobile,
and my car took hold, and I went to the right.''
Mr. Raymond Klauck testified: (Tr. 304, 305, 307)

'' Q.

What was the next movement of the

car~

A. Well, then I knew that he had applied his
brakes, because he was saying, 'My God, I can't
stop.'''
•

•

•

*

"MR. McCULLOUGH: Q. After the brakes
were applied and Mr. Maynard said, 'I can't stop
on the ice,' then you saw the car-observed the
car move over to the right~
A. Yes.''

• • • •
'' Q. So th:,tt if the car hadn't turned to the
right 20 feet before it got to the Ford it would
have went right into the Ford~
A. That's right."

Mr. M. W. Wiscomb testified: (Tr. 234).

'' * * * Evidently he (plaintiff) was trying to
get to the snowbank on the side of the road, to
get out of the path of it (Maynard vehicle) be-
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cause had he have not let upon his brake, and the
transmission took hold so that he could make a
slight turn to get a way from this car, he would
have hit head-on into the car and probably pushed
him. And as we hit him, it picked him up and
carried him on, and he fell off into the side as we
hit the snowbank."
·
(Explanation added).
:Mr.

~l.

\V. Wiscomb further testified: (Tr. 243).

'' Q. In other words, you could feel the
brakes being applied 1
A.. Yes, you could feel it take.
Q. Then it started sliding1
A. Uh huh.
Q. Directly towards the Ford~
A. Right towards the Ford.
Q. Then did you feel any other movement of
the car~
A. Well, as I recall, as I previously stated,
he let his foot off the brake pedal, thereby giving
him a little additional purchase on the road, and
that's what changed our direction.
Q. In other words, you presumed that's what
he did~
A. That's right.
Q. In other words, you figured that he probably eased up on his brakes, because the car
apparently started veering to the right~
A. That's right-no, no, it didn't start
veering to the right, it started sliding directly
into him.''

The plaintiff, Mr. Marion Wright, when he saw defendant's car coming directly toward him and that the
driver was not stopping, ran to the east to get off the
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road and was struck by the defendant Mr. Maynard, as
Mr. Maynard swung to the right. Mr. Wright testified:
(Tr. 115, 116)
'' Q. And as you stood there at the side of
the Mitchell automobile, did you observe an autoroo bile which you later learned was driven by Mr.
Maynard~

A. Well, the first thing that I observed was
the side of that car lit up just like a house.
Q. The side of which car~
A. The side of the car I was standing by,
light up just as bright as could be.
Q. What lit the side of the car~
A. The headlights of Mr. Maynard's car.
Q. And which direction was that coming?
A. That was coming from the south.
Q. Will you describe what you observed
frmn there on~
A. Well, I turned around, and waved my
arms, or waved my hand; I don't know what I did.
Q. You turned around. Which direction did
you face?
A. Turned around and faced the south.
Q. Facing this on-coming automobile?
A. Yes. And the first thing that entered
my mind was that he was going to hit me against
the side of this car. So I took off. That's all I
remember.
Q. Which way did you go~
A. Brother, I took off. I took off for the
snowbank on the east side of the road, towards
my house.''
The defendant's automobile ~arne to rest in a snow·
bank a short distance past the point of impact. The
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plaintiff was disroYered lying in the snowbank to the
right of defendant ·s Yehicle with one foot under the right
running board. (Tr. 30, 41, 60, 153, 15-!, 186, 263, 271,
272 295).
:Jlr. :Jlitchell testified: (Tr. 40)
''A. When-oh I seen his lights. It was just
a little ways from my car, yes.
Q. How far away¥
A. I don't know for sure, because I just
looked up and just a glare hit me right in the
eye.''

The plaintiff, Mr. Wright, testified that the lights
of defendant's automobile lit up the side of the Mitchell
car from a distance of about 250 to 300 feet. (Tr. 133).
Mr. Wright on cross-examination testified as follows:
( Tr. 132-135).

'' Q. I see. Now where was the Maynard
vehicle when you first observed it¥
A. I'd say it was 50 to 60 feet from me,
coming right along the snowbank.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Q: Coming right
along the snowbank. That was the first time you
saw it¥
A. I saw headlights wntil then, then all I saw
was wheels splashing wate.r, and then I ran.
Q. Where were the headlights when you first
saw them?
A. I can't tell you how far up the road, but
they had the car lit up, so I imagine it would be
250, 300 feet. I can't tell you. If they were on
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high beam, they should be 300 feet, or 50, something like that.
Q. But the car was lit up so 50 feet away
you knew there was a car coming~
A. Well, I sure knew there was something
coming that had lights on it.

* * * *
A. I turned around and done this to him.
I don't know; it didn't take him long to travel
250 feet, I will tell you that.
Q. You were waiving your arms, weren't
you~

A. I was waiving one arm or something. I
can't tell you whether I was waiving one arm or
both arms or what.
*

* * *

Q. So that he must have traveled for at least
300 feet along the shoulder of the road, that is,
the unsurfaced portion~
A. I think so.
Q. And seeing him come along in that
fashion, you ran directly into his path~
A. I didn't see him coming; all I saw was
lights ,coming, man, and they were coming.
Q. And you ran directly into his path~
A. I ran off the road like any sane person
would do.''
Trooper N eldon S. Evans of the State Highway
Patrol, one of the investigating officers, testified there
were some wheel tracks leading hack approximately from
the front of the Maynard vehicle, hut not from the front
wheels, about 52 feet to the rear. (Tr. 210). The right
track was visible, however, the left track was only visi-
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ble in spots ; part of the time you could see it and part of
the time you could not. (Tr. 212, 213). Trooper R'Obert
G. Ingersoll of the Highway Patrol, the other investigating officer, testified to substantially the same thing. (Tr.
255).
As plaintiff was standing on the south side of the
stalled Ford automobile, the side of it was lit up by the
headlights of the defendant's car. (Tr. 115, 116). The
events that took place at this time are cogently set forth
in the testimony of the various witnesses both for plaintiff and defendant.
:Mr. Mitchell testified on cross-examination as follows: (T'r. 39, 40).

"Q. Now Mr. Wright came out to your car
and did he come up by the right hand door~
A. Yes.
Q. Did he get in~
A. No.
Q. What did he do~
A. I guess as soon as he got up there he seen
that oar, and started waiving it down.
* * * *
And then Mr. Wright ran to the front 'of
your car, didn't he~
A. Yes.
Q. Right into the path of Mr. Maynard's
automobile~ A. Yes.
* * * *
Q.

Q. Mr. Maynard's car didn't strike your car
at all, did it~
A. No, not that I know of.''
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The plaintiff, Mr. Wright, testified on direct examination: (Tr. 116)

"A. Well, the first thing that I observed
was the side of that car lit up just like a house.

* * * *
Q. What lit the side of the car~
A. The headlights of ~1r. Maynard's car.

* * * *
A. Well, I turned around, and waived my
arms, or waived my hand; I don't know what I
did.
Q. You turned around. Which direction did
you face~
A. ·Turned around and faced the south.
Q. Facing this on-coming automobile~
A. Yes. And the first thing that entered my
mind was that he was going to hit me against the
side of his car, so I took off. That's all I remember.
Q. Which way did you go~
A. Brother I took off. I took off for the
snowbank on the east side of the road, towards my
house.
Q. Did you observe where the Maynard car
was traveling in relation to the concrete highway?
A. It was clear off the highway the only
time I saw it.
Q. And that's off which direction~
A. That's off east of the highway."
Mr. Wright, plaintiff, on cross-examination, further
testified : ( Tr. 133, 135)
'' Q. Where were the headlights when you
first saw them?
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A. I can't tell you how far up the road, but
they had the car lit up, so I imagine it would be
250, 300 feet. I can't tell you. If they were on
high beam, they should be 300 feet, or 50, something like that.
• * • •
Q. And seeing him come along in that
fashion, you ran directly into his path~
A. I didn't see him coming; all I saw was
his lights coming, man, and they were coming.
Q. And you ran directly into his path~
A. I ran off the road like any sane person
would do.
Q. Into his path~
A. I didn't run into his path, he run over my
path.
Q. Your paths intersected, didn't they~
A. They certainly did, and I got the blunt
of it."

Defendant Maynard testified on direct examination:
(Tr. 152, 153).
''A. I had to make a mental decision on what
to do. There was traffice coming from the north.
I couldn't go to the left without crashing headon. I had five rpassengers in my car to consider besides the man standing at the side of the car. I
applied my brakes and my car slid directly at the
stalled car. And I felt that if I continued in that
course, I would pin that man between the two cars,
between the front end of my car and the side of
the stalled automobile. So I pulled m·y car to the
right, and played my brakes, to give me some
traction to get to the right of that stalled automobile, and my car took hold, and I went to the
right.
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Q. When you say your car took hold, what
do you mean by that~
A. The steering apparatus took hold, and I
veered to the right and avoided hitting the ,car
broadside.
Q. Now did anything else happen at that
time~

A. At about-at the point I got almost to
that automobile, I had pulled to the right, and was
avoiding it, Mr. Wright broke from in front of
it and jumped right in front of my automobile.
Q. Did your automobile strike Mr. Wright¥
A. My automobile struck Mr. Wright.
Q. Were you continuously applying your
brakes during the time that this transpired~
A. As I said, I played my brakes when it was
obvious that if I held them intact I would slide
directly broadside into the stalled automobile. So
I merely played them to pull myself to the right
and avoid the accident."
Mr. Maynard further testified on direct examination:

"Q. * * * Did you see Mr. Wright when you
hit

him~

A. When he lunged in front of me, I definitely hollered as loud as I could, 'No, No, No,' just
before the point of impact.
Q. How far were you away then, when you
hollered, 'no, no, no~''
A. I was practically to the car, and he
dashed in front of me, as I hollered it out.
Q. In other words he ran toward the side
of the road~
A. That's right, from his position."
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~Irs. ~\my

Klauck testified on direct examination as
follows: (Tr. 260, 261).
''A. " . . ell, as we '"ere traveling north, we
came around a Yery small bend in the road. It
wasn't a sharp bend, but it was a curve in the
road. And our headlights picked up a car that was
stalled broadside this way. He was standing to
the south of it waiving his arms and Mr. Maynard
tried to turn* * *

* * * *
A. Tried to turn. There was on-coming
traffic from the north, and had we turned in the
usual left hand to pass, trying to get around that,
we would have hit the on-coming traffic as he
turned to the left. As we got to the car * * *
Q. Just a moment.
A. Or to the right, I beg your pardon. We
turned to the right and as we got to the car, this
man jumped in front of us.''
Mrs. Alta Maynard, wife of defendant, testified
as follows: ( Tr. 276)
"A. We didn't go to the left. There was
traffic coming, so we turned to the right. And
just as we got in-just before we went in front
of the ,car, Mr. Wright jumped in front of us."

Mr. M. W. Wiscomb testified on direct examination: (Tr. 233, 234)
''A. And as he applied his brakes, he started
to slide right towards the car. Then as he got a
little closer, he let up on his brakes and that more
or less had a tendancy to give him a little more
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purchase on the road, as the ignition took hold,
and he turned and passed this car on the east,
just missing it, and at the same time there was
a man in front of this car waiving his arms in
this manner (indicating), attempting to have us
see it, beoouse there was no lights on the car.
And as he made this slight turn and went in front
of this car, it creased his hind fender, just ticked
it. And just before we passed this car, the man
who was waiving his hands in front of there
jumped, jumped right in front of us. Evidently
he was trying to get to the snowbank on the side of
the road, to get out of the path of it, because had
he have not let up on his brake, and the transmission took hold so that he could make a slight
turn to get away from this car, he would have hit
head-on into the car and probably pushed him.
And as we hit him it picked him up and carried
him on, and he fell off into the side as we hit the
snowbank.''
Mrs. Dorothy Wiscomb testified on direct examination as follows : '( Tr. 284).
''A. Well, there was a slight turn in the
road where this haJppened and just as our lights
caught the-coming around the bend, there was
a car straight across the road, cross-ways and a
man standing to the side of it. And when I first
saw him, he was turned around and started waiving his hands at us to stop. And apparently Mr.
Maynard tried to stop, but the road being slick,
we were sliding right towards him. And just before we got to the car, he managed to turn out to
the left into-or to the right, into the snowbank.
And just at that time the man run from the car
right in front of us."
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Mr. Raymond Klauck testified on direct examinaation as follows: (Tr. 295 ).
·'A. 'Vhat I saw happen, there was a car
parked directly across the road, and a man standing in his white coveralls waiving his hands up
and down.
e attempted to stop-I know the
brakes were applied. That's only natural. You
know that being in the car.
Q. 'Yas there any change in the movement,
or feeling in the automobile¥
A. Yes, naturally-well, we wasn't going
at a very good rate of speed. The change would
be slow on ice and all of a sudden the car just took
over to one side.
Q. And when did it take over to one side 1
A. Oh, I would say approximately 10 or 15
feet before we approached the front of the car,
or maybe a little bit further.
Q. I see. What else occurred at that time if
anything?
A. Well, the-Mr. Wright had jumped out
in front of our car, and of course we caught him
with the front of our bumper.

'y

• • • •
Q. Then what happened?
A. Well, then because the car was on the
angle, we hit the snowbank and went into the
snowbank.''
Mr. Raymond Klauck . testified further on crossexamination: (Tr. 305, 306).
'' Q. After the brakes were applied and Mr.
Maynard said, 'I can't stop on the ice,' then you
saw the car-observed the car move over to the
right?

A. Yes.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
Q. And how far did the car-how far was
the car from the Ford when he turned to the right,
as you stated~
A. Oh, I would say approximately 20, 25
feet."

Mr. Raymond Klauck who was sitting in the middle
in the back seat testified that from his observations it
was his opinion that the headlights of the defendant's
automobile were on low beam. (Tr. 298). The defendant,
Mr..Maynard, testified that he did not know whether his
lights were on high beam or low beam. (Tr. 148). Mr.
M. W. Wiscomb who was sitting on the front seat on the
right side testified that the lights were in good condition; that they showed the Ford automobile of Mr.
Mitchell about 200 to 250 feet away. (Tr. 239).
Passengers in the Maynard automobile estimated the
speed from 20 to 25 miles per hour, with most of them fixing the speed from 25 to 30 miles per hour. {Tr. 173, 249,
259, 275, 284, 298). They estimated the speed at the time
the Maynard car came into contact with the snowbank
from 8 to 10 miles per hour. (Tr. 248, 249). No testimony was offered by plaintiff or witnesses for plaintiff
with respect to the speed in miles per hour of the Maynard automobile.
It is undisputed that the Maynard car came to rest
in a snowbank in such fashion that the front and right
side of the car were embedded in the snow. Witnesses
on behalf of plaintiff testified that the car was completely
into the snowbank except for the left rear wheel. (Tr.
41, 55, 79, 96). Witnesses on behalf of defendant testified
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that the left side of the car and rear wheels were entirely
free of the sno'v bank. ( Tr. 153. 155, 208, 222).
Byron Jensen testified that on June 8, 1949, he
examined the lights of defendant's car for purposes of
the state inspection law and found them to be in good
order and in compliance with state requirements. (T~.
25-1). ~\. foundation for his testimony was laid by testimony of defendant that his lights had not been adjusted,
replaced or repaired between January 14, and June 8,
1949: (Tr. 163).
With respect to the width of the road plaintiff and
certain witnesses called on his behalf testified that the
main portion of the road was 27 feet wide and an additional 4-ft. paved shoulder on each side. ( Tr. 107). Plaintiff and witnesses who testified on his behalf also testified that the shoulder of the road had been cleared to
a distance of 12 to 15 feet east of the easterly edge of the
paved portion of the highway. (Tr. SO, 93, 118). There
is no dispute that there was a large snowbank running
along the east edge of the road approximately 3 to 31f2
feet high and some distance east of the east edge of the
paved portion of the road.
Officers Evans and Ingersoll, members of the State
Highway Patrol, who had investigated the accident, were
called and testified on the part of the defendant. They
stated that by ta:pe measurement the width of the paved
portion of the road was 27 feet. (Tr. 207, 210, 214, 215,
219, 223). They estimated that the distance at the side
of the road cleared of snow at 10 or 12 feet. (Tr. 210,
215,216,218, 224). Klauck estimated the cleared distance
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at 7 to 8 feet. (Tr. 305). Defendant Maynard testified
that the snow had beew cle1ared ''beyond the pa;ved edge
of the highw1ay no more th~ 2 or 3 feet." (Tr. 151).
There is also a sharp dispute in the evidence as to
the condition of the road at the time of the accident. Witnesses called on behalf of plaintiff testified that the
highway was either dry, or damp, or wet. They testified that generally there was no ~ce on Highway 91 except in spots, and a strip down the center where the
cars had not cut in, and that generally the paved portion
of the road was free of hard packed snow. Mr. Wright
testified that there had been some thawing and that there
was slush at the sides of the road. (Tr. 33, 47, 60, 65, 67,
72, 98, 117, 135). Occupants of the Maynard vehicle and
the patrolmen who investigated the accident testified that
the roads were entirely cover·ed with a sheet of glare ice
and that they were extremely slick and slippery. (Tr.
147, 167, 209, 219, 222, 223, 224, 227, 229 232, 237, 259,
260, 265, 275,280 283,284,285,293,300, 301).
There is a dispute in the evidence as to how far the
Mitchell vehicle extended onto Highway 91 from the
driveway leading into the plaintiff's home. Witnesses
for plaintiff testified that the Mitchell car was somewhere near the east edge of the paved portion of the road.
Mitchell testified that the rear wheels were just over
the east edge of the paved portion of the highway. ('Tr.
10, 38). Plaintiff testified that the rear bum'P'er of the
Mitchell car was about even with the west edge of the east
4-ft. paved shoulder of Highway 91. (Tr. 10, 38, 45, 90,
114, 115).
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'y

~Ir. Robert
right testified that on the evening
of the crash he passed the 'V right Garage while driving
his car north and ::;a"T :Jfr. \Vright standing on the south
side of the Ford :Jiitchell automobile. The Ford automobile was out on Highway 91 facing to the south at about
a -±5° angle. In passing to the rear of the Ford Mitchell
automobile it was not necessary for him to swing to the
left, but he passed the Ford by driving in his own right
hand lane. ( Tr. 90, 91).
:Jir. Lee Schoen testified that on the evening of the
crash he passed the Wright Garage while driving Highway 91 going north to American Fork to attend a basketball game. :Mr. Schoell passed the Ford Mitchell automobile which was headed in an angle to the south. He also
noticed another car in the snowbank O'pposite the highway and north of the Ford Mitchell automobile. In driving past the rear of the Ford Mitchell automobile he
remained in his own lane of traffi.c. He testified that
the only difficulty was that he, ''had to slow down a little
bit in order to do it, as you will, if you approach a car
that is on the edge of the highway." (Tr. 44, 45, 46).
Mr. :l\lerle Paulk testified that after the Maynard
vehicle had crashed off the road into the snowbank, that
he passed Mr. Mitchell's Ford automobile, which was protruding onto Highway 91, by driving on his ·own side of
the paved portion of the road. It was not necessary that
he drive out around to the left in order to pass the
Mitchell automobile. (Tr. 71).
Occupants of the Maynard automobile, testified that
the Mitchell automobile was squarely astride the right
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hand or northbound driving lane of Highway 91, completely blocking passage of northbound traffic. (Tr. 150,
233, 260, 283, 295).
It was stipulated by counsel for plaintiff and defendant that the length of the Mitchell automobile was approximately 15 feet. (Tr. 131). The Maynard automobile passed between the front end of the Mitchell
automobile and the snowbank directly to the east of Highway 91. The left rear fender of the Maynard automobile
scraped against the bumper of the Mitchell automobile
in passing in front of it, otherwise there was no contract between the two vehicles. (Tr. 41, 131-132).
There is conflict in the evidence as to whether there
was on-coming traffic from the north at the time the
collision occurred. Plaintiff and Mr. Mitchell testified
they looked to the north immediately prior to the accident and there was no traffic approaching from the north
at that time. ( Tr. 32, 115, 135). Mr. Merle Paulk testified that he pulled onto the highway south of the Wright
Garage and followed behind the Maynard automobile
until it crashed off the highway into the snowbank, and
that there was no traffic approaching from the north at
the time of the accident. (Tr. 69). Defendant and several
passengers in his car testified there was oncoming traffic
from the north making it impossible for them to pass to
the left of the Mitchell automobile without crashing into
the southbound traffic. (Tr. 149, 162, 261, 275, 294, 298).
Defendant testified that plaintiff stated to him that
he, the plaintiff, did not hold him, the defendant, in any
way responsible for the accident. Mr. Reese James Wil-
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liams, who was a patient in the same room in the hospital
as the plaintiff, testified to a similar statement made by
the plaintiff. (Tr. 161, 201, 202). This testimony was dened by plaintiff (Tr. 328). ~Ir. Reese James Williams
also testified that he was an intimate acquaintance of
~Ir. ~Iaynard and had known him for about 14 years and
was frequently in :.Mr. Maynard's home. (Tr. 202, 203).
At the conclusion of the trial, both parties made
motions for directed verdicts. ( Tr. 335, 336, 337). The
motion of the defendant was denied. After argument, the
motion of the plaintiff was granted. The jury r·eturned a
verdict, in favor of the plaintiff, in the sum of $1,004.44
(R. 44). The jury allowed plaintiff $480.00 for general
damages. The items of special damages claimed by plaintiff were cut in half by the jury although there was no
dispute in the evidence as to most of the items of special
damages claimed by plaintiff. (R. 44).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
A. THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES
THAT DEFENDANT COULD NOT STOP HIS AUTOMOBILE
WITHIN THE RANGE OF HIS VISION, i.e., THE DISTANCE
ILLUMINATED BY HIS HEADLIGHTS.
B. THE "ASSURED CLEAR DISTANCE RULE" AS
EXPRESSED IN DALLEY VS. MIDWESTERN DAIRY PRODUCTS CO. (80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309 [1932] ) AND IN THE
CASES DECIDED BY THIS COURT SUBSEQUENT TO THE
DALLEY CASE, IS THE LAW OF THIS STATE.
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C. THE RULE OF LAW AS LAID DOWN IN THE DALLEY CASE, AND THE CASES DECIDED SUBSEQUENT
THERETO, IS APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE.

II.
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.

III.
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT.

IV.
THE JURY COULD NOT HAVE FOUND THIS TO BE
AN UNA VOIDABLE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE, N 0 T
CHARGEABLE TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF EITHER PARTY
TO THE ACTION.

ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
A. THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABUSHES
THAT DEFENDANT COULD NOT STOP HIS AUTOMOBILE
WITHIN THE RANGE OF HIS VISION, i.e., THE DISTANCE
ILLUMINATED BY HIS HEADLIGHTS.

The lower court held that defendant, because he did
not have his car under control, so as to be able to stop it
within the range of his vision, i.e., the distance illuminated by his headlights, was guilty of negligence as a
Inatter of law. The court's finding is supported by the
testimony of defendant himself and defendant's witnesses, who were riding in the car with defendant.
Defendant's statement (P. 17, 18 of defendant's
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brief), ''It is clear fron1 the testimony of the defendant
and the passengers in his car, that no all out effort was
made by the defendant to bring his car to a complete
stop,·' is erroneous. Defendant makes no reference to the
record to support such a statement.
Plaintiff has set forth in some detail the testi1nony
of defendant and defendant's witnesses regarding this
point in his statement of fact (see pages 7, 8, 9),
therefore, only short excerpts of testimony are inserted
here.
Mr.

~Iay""Dard:

(Tr. 153, 152).

"* * * I played my brakes when it was obvious that if I held them intact I would slide directly broadside into the stalled automobile * * *''
'' * * * I applied my brakes and my car slid
directly at the stalled car, and I felt that if I
continued in that course I would pin that man between th two cars, between the front end of nry
car and the side of the stalled automobile * • *"
Mr. Raymond Klauck: ·(Tr. 304, 305, 307)
''Well, then I knew he had applied his brakes,
because he was saying, 'My God, I can't stop.'"
Mr. Wiscomb: (Tr. 234)

'' * * * Evidently he (plaintiff) was trying to
get to the snowbank on the side of the road, to
get out of the 11ath of it (defendant's car), because had he have not let up on his brakes, and the
transmission took hold so that he could make a
slight turn to get away from this car, he would
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have hit head on into the car and probably pushed
him * * * '' (explanation added).
The testimony is conclusive that defendant could
not stop his car within the range of his vision, i.e., the
distance illuminated by his headlights.
B. THE "ASSURED CLEAR DISTANCE RULE" AS
EXPRESSED IN DALLEY VS. MIDWESTERN DAIRY PRODUCTS CO. (80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309 [1932] ) AND IN THE
CASES DECIDED BY THIS COURT SUBSEQUENT TO THE
DALLEY CASE, IS THE LAW OF THIS STATE.

This court in the Dalley case set down the following
rule of law: (P. 310 P. 2d)
''In this jurisdiction the doctrine is established,' that it is negligence as a matter of law for
a person to drive an automobile upon a traveled
public highway, used by vehicles and pedestrians,
at such a rate of speed that said automobile cannot
be stopped within the distance at which the operator of said car is able to see objects upon the
highway in front of him.' "
This court in subsequent cases, which plaintiff will
discuss, has clarified this rule to conform to emergency
conditions, sudden changes in circumstances, etc., but it
has not abrogated this rule.
In HANSEN V. CLYDE, et al, 89 Utah 31, 56 P. 2d
1366 (1936), a similar rule of law was laid down by this
court: (P. 37 [Utah] )

'' * * * When a driver upon a public highway
with his light equipment cannot see more than 50
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feet ahead of him. it is his duty to stop within that
distance • • • ··
Defendant seems to take great comfort in the dissenting opinion of ~Ir. Justice "\Volfe in the Clyde case
(P. 39 Utah). Defendant cites the ninth example given
by ~Ir. Justice "\Y olfe in his dissent to sustain his position that defendant was not negligent and that the socalled ·'assured clear distance rule'' is no longer the law
of this state. Plaintiff is unable to understand defendant's conjurations at this point.
~Ir. Justice "\Volfe concedes that the law of this state
is as set forth in the Dalley case. The examples he cites
in his dissent deal with the question of causation, remoteness and intervening causes. Mr. Justice Wolfe states
(P. 42 Utah):

'' * * * Be that as it may, at this juncture the
state of the law in this jurisdiction is that Bosone
was negligent. The logic of the rule is that he
must be able to stop within the distance he can see
objects on the road; not out in the field * * * ''
(P. 43 Utah):
''We next come to the difficult question as
to whether the negligence concurred to contribute
to the accident* * * The decisions use such terms
as 'too remote,' 'proximate,' 'immediate,' efficient' and 'concurrent' causes, * * * "
In the case of NIELSEN V. W AT ANABE, 90 Utah
401, 62 P. 2d 117, immediately prior to the accident the
brilliant lights from a car coming from the opposite di-
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rection completely blinded and destroyed the vision of
the driver and there was an instant period of darkness
which rendered it impossible for him to see any object
upon the highway and that during that instant the accident occurred.
The court stated at page 119 (P. 2d):
''If the truck could not, because of some obstruction, be seen as plaintiff and her husband approached it prior to the time they were blinded,
and if pZaintiff's husba;nd, was driving at a lawfUl
rate ~of speed an automobile properly equipped
with lights a;nd b11akes a;nd without any reason to
believe the headlights of another automobile would
suddenly or wnexpectedly blind him, that while so
blinded, the collision occurred without time for him
to reduce his speed orr stop his automobile, the
rule anwownced the 10ases relied upon by defendant amd heretofore cited in this opinion would not
apply." (Referring to Dalley case, etc.).

m

The logic of the rule necessarily implies that sudden
changes, emergencies, etc., which could not be foreseen
would limit the use of the rule. The court is merely stating something which is necessarily implied.
In the case of MOSS V. CHRISTENSEN-GARDNER, INC., 98 Utah 253, 98 P. 2d 363 (1940), the same
question was presented as in the Watanabe case heretofore discussed. In this case plaintiff had reduced his
speed because of an accumulation of smoke and mist in
the vicinity, suddenly the glare of the headlights of an
approaching vehicle impaired his visibilty until it was im-
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possible for him to see an unlighted and unmarked barricade. The court stated. (P. 364, P 2d)
· •However a case recently de,cided by this
court, Nielsen v. 'yatanabe, • • • is, in our opinion,
conclusive of the question here presented.''
The court in clarifying the application of the rule
is merely reiterating what is already necessarily implied that unforeseeable changes, emergencies, conditions, constitute a legal excuse for not being able to stop
within the driver's vision or lights. Mr. Justice Wolfe
in concurring expresses the same idea.
Defendant cites a portion of the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Larsen wherein he states (p. 367, P 2d):
''I think the Dalley case should be overruled,
or the doctrine thereof modified so as to make
possible a realistic approach to the problem.''
I think all that need be said here is that the ru1e has
already been modified or clarified and that this clarification or "modification" to render the rule applicable
to modern-day traffic does not involve '' sut>er refinements in reasoning and hair-splitting in logic.''
In the case of TRIMBLE, et ux, V. UNION P ACIFIC STAGES, et al, 105 Utah 457, 142 P. 2d 674 (1943),
this court followed the same rules that it laid down in
the cases of Nielsen v. Watanabe (cited supra), Moss
v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc. (cited supra). The court
stated at page 676 (P. 2d):
"Appellant argues that since defendant's bus
was moving at such a speed after entering the fog
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that it could not be stopped within the driver's
range of vision the driver and principals, the
defendants, were guilty of negligence as a matter
of law. Thus in effect the appellants ask this court
to say that 'One driving on a highway at night is
bound to anticipate that there will be fog, smoke,
or some other obstruction which will reduce the
driver's vision, and that therefore all must drive
at such speed that should they meet with such an
obstacle they can stop their automobile within the
range of their vision as it is limited by this obstruction. We do not believe this to be the correct
rule of law, or the situation to which the rule laid
down in the Dalley case, supra, was intended to
apply. In Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401, 62
P. 2d 117, 119, there was a situation similar to the
one in this case* * *''
In HORSLEY V. ROBINSON, 112 Utah 227, 186
P. 2d 592 ·( 1947), this court had before it the question
of the duty a driver of a passenger vehicle owes to his
passengers. Justice Wade in the course of his opinion
stated (p. 597 [P. 2d] ) :
''In Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465,
214 P. 304, the defendant was driving his car at
night during a heavy rain storm at about 12 miles
per hour; in the distance the lights of oncoming
cars reflected on the wet pavement into his eyes
so that at the time of the accident he was unable
to see the plaintiff walking on the pavement in
front of him until he was within 6 feet and then it
was too late to avoid running him down. We held
that defendant was negligent as a matter of law,
no matter how dark and stormy the night or how
bad the visibility, if he drove at such a rate of
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tiff down within the distance plaintiff rould be
seen walking ahead of defendant's car on the
highway. To the san1e effect see: Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P.
2d 309: Haarstrich v. Oregon Short Line RR Co.,
70 Utah 332, 2G2 P. 100; O'Brien v. Alston, 61
Utah ~iliS, 213 P. 791.
"The Xikoleropoulos v. Ramsey case is in
substance a holding that it is negligence to operate
a vehicle on the highway at any time without
having it under sufficient control so that others
using the highway will not be unreasonably endangered thereby, regardless of how slow it is required to travel to accomplish that end. If that
is the rule where visibility is involved, it follows
that the same rule applies where the lack of control which endangers others is the result of slippery roads and stormy conditions * * * ''

In the case of HICKMAN Y. UNION PACIFIC
RR CO., ------ Utah ______ , 213 P. 2d 650 (Jan. 1950), this
court had before it the question of the use of this rule
in an instruction by the lower court to the jury. The
lower court instructed:

"* * • You are instructed that when a railroad company is using its right-of-way in a careful
and lawful manner, the employees in charge of its
trains have a right to presume that motorists
approaching on streets or highways which cross
the railroad track will proceed carefully and lawfully, and the railroad company's employees have
a right to presume that motorists on the highway
will drive with their cars under such control as
to be able to stop within the di::;tance at which they
can see objects ahead."
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This court there held that where the driver's view was
unobstructed ahead and on either side and nothing to
impair his vision, that the rule was clearly applicable.
Mr. Justice Wolfe ~oncurring in the result pays
particular attention to the use of this rule. He states:

'' * * * So it comes down to this, that in any
case unless a moving object has come onto the
roadway at such a distance before an a;prproaching automobile so as to be illuminated by the
lights of the said automobile when by their power
they would first .catch a stationary ·object, instructions as to the speed-light range relationship
are not applicable but confusing. Put in another
way, where a moving object intrudes itself into
the cone of light made by the lights of an automobile at a point nearer to the car than the total
distance in which its lights will first reveal objects, instructions as to the speed-light range relationship are not applicable.''
It is interesting to note the statement of the Utah
rule as expressed by the United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit, MARAGAKIS V. UNITED STATES,
172 F. 2d 393, 394 (1949). Judge Murrah states:
"The later Utah cases have rationalized the
rule to allow an area of discretion under conditions 'suddenly and unexpectedly' arising within
the clear vision ahead, which with the exercise
of due care the driver could not have avoided the
collision * * * ''
See also the case of GATTON V. F. J. EGNER &
SON INC. 73 NE 2d 812 (Dec. 1946) where the Ohio
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Court of ~'-ppeals had before it a case involving the
"assured clear distance ahead" statute which has been
enacted in Ohio as well as a nmnber of other states. The
Ohio court unhesitatingly cites the Dalley case (cited
supra) as authority for the rule.
Defendant, by the statements made in his brief
would have us believe that the ''assured clear distance
ahead" rule, or by whatever name it may be called, is
a disreputable rule and has been rejected by most of ''our
sister states.'' Defendant from page 32 through page 44
of his brief cites and quotes from a ''basketful!'' of
cases which he contends uphold his statements. The rule
as relied upon by plaintiff has been discussed and debated before this Utah court on numerous occasions. It
can serve no purpose to rehash an argument which has
already been determined. Of the cases cited by defendant, many compare with decisions of this court in Nielsen
v. Watanabe (cited supra); Moss v. Christensen-Gardner,
Inc., (cited supra) ; and Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages
(cited supra).
Defendant cites and quotes at page 35 of his brief
the California case of Sawdey v. Rasmussen, 290 P. 684,
to sustain his position that California has rejected the
rule. Defendant should look to the later California case
of JONES V. HEDGES, 123 Cal. App. 742, 12 P. 2d
111, 115, which impliedly accepts the rule.
C. THE RULE OF LAW AS LAID DOWN IN THE DALLEY CASE, AND THE CASES DECIDED SUBSEQUENT
THERETO, IS APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE.

Defendant testified that it was approximately 260
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feet from the Wright Garage south to the curv.e in Highway 91. (Tr. 148). Defendant stated that his headlights
revealed the stalled Ford Mitchell automobile to him
when he was 100 feet from it. (Tr. 173-174). At the time
the stalled Ford :Mitchell automobile was first observed,
plaintiff was standing on the south side of the Ford waiving his arms. (Tr. 91, 142, 176, 261, 287, 295, 151, 234,
260, 276, 284). Defendant and witnesses called on his behalf testified that the defendant could not stop the car.
(Tr. 152, 153, 304, 305, 307, 234, 243). (See also pages
7, 8, 9 of plaintiff's brief).
The essence of defendant's own testimony and nf the
witnesses who testified on his behalf is that defendant did
not have his ,car under control and could not stop it within the range of his vision, i.e., the distance illuminated
by his headlights. At the time the crash occurred it was
night time, howev-er there was no fog. (Tr. 32, 58, 73, 79,
147) no low hanging clouds, no rain or snow. (Tr. 48).
The view from the curve in Highway 91 north to where
the stalled Ford was situated was unobstructed. (Tr. 48,
59). The lights on defendant's automobile picked up the

stalled Ford automobile either as the car approached
within the distance illuminated by them, or as the car
rounded the curve they swept into view the Ford automobile. (T'r. 148, 173-174, 303, 304, 386, 238, 239, 240). (See
also pages 4, 5, 6, 7 of plaintiff's brief).
The facts of this case are squarely within the rule
and defendant was negligent as a matter of law.
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II.
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.

III.
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT.

IV.
THE JURY COULD NOT HAVE FOUND THIS TO BE
AN UNA VOIDABLE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE, N 0 T
CHARGEABLE TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF EITHER PARTY
TO THE ACTION.

(Points II, III, and IV will be argued together).
Defendant rounded the curve in Highway 91 and
proceeded down the road. Defendant did not have his car
under control as by his own admission he could not stop
within the distance illuminated by his headlights as the
lights picked up the stalled Ford automobile and the
plaintiff. ( Tr. 153, 152, 304, 305, 307, 234, 243).
The plaintiff upon seeing the lights of defendant's
automobile approximately 250-300 feet away began waiving his arms. (Tr. 132-135). When it was obvious that
if he, plaintiff, remained where he was standing he would
be crushed between the two cars he acted as any reasonably prudent man would ~ct and ran for the side of the
road to the east. (Tr. 116, 152, 153, 185).
Defendant Maynard testified (Tr. 153, 155):

'' Q. When you say your car took hold, what
do you mean by that~
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A. The steering ~appartatus took hold, and I
veered to the right and avoided hitting the car
broadside.''

Mr. Wiscomb stated (Tr. 233, 234) :
''"" • "" Evidently he (!plaintiff) was trying
to get to the snowbank on the side of the road, to
get out of the path of it (Maynard vehicle), because had he not have let up on on his brak,e, and
the transmission took hold so that he could make
a slight turn to get away from this car, he would
have hit head-on into the car and probably pushed
him. And as we hit him it picked him up and carried him on and he fell off into the side as we hit
the snowbank.''
Mrs. Wiscomb

~estified

(Tr. 284):

''And just before we got to the car he managed to turn out to the left into-or to the right,
into the snowbarnk. ''
Mr. Klauck stated (Tr. 295):
''A. Yes, naturally-Well, we wasn't going
at a very good rate of speed. The change would be
slow on ice ·and all of ,a sudden the oar just t·ook
over to the right.
Q. And when did it take over to the right~
A. Oh, I would say approximately 10 or 15
feet before we approached the front of the car, or
maybe a little bit further.''
Plaintiff acted as a reasonably prudent man would
act, faced with the same situation. Defendant sliding and
skiding toward plaintiff, about to crush him between two
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cars, must foresee and expect that his intended victim
will attempt to get out of the way, and the only logical
and reasonable place for him to go is off the road. The
plaintiff did not suddenly jun1p under defendant's vehicle. Defendant saw plaintiff and the stalled Ford
when he was 100 feet away and traveling 30 m.p.h. (Tr.
173, 176).
:Jir. Raymond Klauck, who was riding in the middle
of the rear seat of the :Maynard vehicle saw the stalled
Ford when they were 300 feet from it (Tr. 3_Q3).
:Jir. :JI. W. Wiscomb, who was riding on the right
hand side of the Maynard vehicle saw the stalled Ford
and plaintiff waiving his arms when they were 200 to 250
feet away. (Tr. 239, 240).
Defendant, from his unsupported statements, would
have us believe that defendant casually drove his car to
the right with the situation entirely under control and
without the slightest degree of danger to anyone. It is
evident that defendant has no faith in his argument for
he makes no reference to his "undisputed" testimony
to support it.
CONCLUSION

Judgment for plaintiff should be affirmed.
Resp~tfully

submitted,

McCULLOUGH, BOYCE &
McCULLOUGH,
Attorneys for Plaimtiff
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